Model of public choice and political rent
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Abstract
It can be assumed that the scope of agricultural policy and connected with its financial streams are not accidental. Selection of a particular, policy defines a mechanism in which the benefits and costs are combined. Such an effort of describing and explaining the mechanism was presented in the paper. We use the concept of a public choice model. Issues of including political (or administrative) interest in defining and shaping the policy are incorporated into the models of public choice. The authors assumed the rationality of decision makers and their goal to maximize their own utility. The analysis presented in the paper is some reference to one of the trends of political economy, according to which the emphasis is on the voters’ behaviour.
Keywords: Public choice, political rent, agricultural policy, political-economic analysis
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